Anti-Israel rallies throughout Australia suggest that Australia's leaders are unaware of the danger of a swarm attack of the type executed by HAMAS on October 7, and employed by jihadis for over a decade
by Ganesh Sahathevan
The images of Israel’s Iron Dome being overwhelmed by thousands of Hamas-fired rockets, as well as the scenes of Hamas assault teams swarming Kibbutzim and wracking passing cars with gunfire, will leave a traumatic legacy likely to shape Israeli politics for decades to come.
Providing a more detailed analysis Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed state in te Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:
Hamas’ recent attacks on Israel have shocked many with their brutality and disregard for the norms and laws of armed conflict. They have also surprised experts with their complexity and coordination, involving simultaneous linked and layered operations on land, air, and sea. While Hamas is a terrorist organization—and behaving like one—it is fighting more like a state military force.
Small, tactical drones are a central factor in its proficiency, which the group deployed in sophisticated and multifaceted ways during the invasion. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) constituted the first wave of attacks to eliminate Israeli observation towers, cameras, and communications. This initial challenge was meant to blind, deafen, and confuse the Israeli defense.
The group also dropped munitions from UAS on tanks, apparently well aware of how to target them for disabling, as well as soldiers and emergency responders. Swarms of drones were also deployed to attack naval vessels and energy infrastructure.
HAMAS has demonstrated how the methods utilized to enable swarming have grown in sophistication over the past decade. The question for Australia is whether its decision makers are prepared for such attacks. Continued mass protests against Israel all over Australia suggest that they are not even aware of the danger.
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Paris 13/11 and Mumbai 26/11 are both examples of swarming except that in Paris suicide bombers were utilized to maximize civilian losses within a relatively short incident. It should also be noted that France has a history of jihadi swarms but yet nothing it appears has been done to counter the threat. The lesson of Paris is clear: a terrorist threat must be dealt with swiftly.
The late B.Raman wrote extensively on Mumbai 26/11 and provided some suggestions as to how a similar incident could be avoided, based on his experience which included heading the R&AW's counter-terrorism section While each situation is unique, Australian authorities are well advised to take heed of what he proposes.As Lindt and the aftermath of the Cronulla riots proved, Australia's security and intelligence agencies are incapable of dealing with a Paris or Mumbai style attack.
This is not to say that Australia does not have the means to deal with the threat. The Army's Tactical Assault Group East (Tag-E) was formed just after 9-11 to deal with such threats. In fact, Tag-E trained for an incident such as Lindt in 2013 but the collective incompetence of NSW Police,AFP, ASIO and the PM Tony Abbott's security advisors ensured that Tag-E capabilities were ignored.
Raman outlined in the article below how India's intelligence and special forces (the National Security Guard, or Black Cats) could be combined to better address Mumbai type attacks. The same needs to be done here to ensure that Tag-E is the first response to a terrorist attack here. Another "16 hours of peaceful resolution" is not the answer.
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How India can prevent another 26/11
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Image: The cover of B Raman's new book, Mumbai 26/11: A Day of Infamy.
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