Structures for the support of Muslim militants in South East Asia with particular regard to structures for the financing of terrorist activities

First published in March 2005.A Working Paper of of the Terrorist Financing Working Group, Madrid Summit On Terrorism & Democracy, March 2005.

Structures for the support of Muslim militants in South East Asia with particular regard to structures for the financing of terrorist activities

,Introduction

On 30 July 2002 the ASEAN Regional Forum, on behalf of the participating states and organizations, issued the following statement¹:

“In the interest of global peace and security, the participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are determined to stop the financing of terrorism.”

In pursuing our goals, we have agreed to the following concrete steps:

 Freezing Terrorist Assets

·        Each ARF participant will implement the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1373, to stop the financing of terrorism.

·        In accordance with UNSCR 1373, each ARF participant will, within its jurisdiction, freeze without delay the assets of terrorists and their associates and close their access to the international financial system.

·        Each ARF participant will, consistent with its laws, make public the lists of terrorists whose assets are subject to freezing, and the amount of assets frozen, if any.

 Implementation of International Standards

·        Each ARF participant will aim to approve, accept, ratify or accede to and implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as soon as possible.

·        Each ARF participant will aim to approve, accept, ratify or accede to and implement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

·        We will work co-operatively and in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, FATF and FATF-style bodies, FSF, Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), and other relevant international and regional bodies to promote the adoption, implementation, and assessment of international standards or recommendations to combat the abuses of the financial system, including in respect of terrorist financing, financial regulation, and money laundering.

ASEAN’s member states include two predominantly Muslim countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the relationship between these two countries and Muslim militants that operate within their borders provides disturbing evidence of how declarations such as those above are in effect meaningless in the context of the international attempt to curb the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

The objectives of Islamist terror and insurgency in South East Asia-some evidence of governmental assistance to Muslim militants

The attitude of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments to Muslim militants is best understood when the objectives of these militants, or terrorist are understood.

As will be demonstrated next, the objectives of these groups are aligned with those of these two governments and consequently a synergistic relationship between these groups and their host countries can be shown.

Muslim militants in south east Asia and their objectives

The simplest way to describe the objectives of Islamist terrorist in this region is to consider the activities of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), and more recently the Jemaah Islamiah (JI).

All three have in common the Islamic faith, and their members are of the Malay race and their cause is centered on both their religion and their race.

In summary, the PULO seek the secession of southern Thailand which is predominantly Malay, so as to join with neighboring Malaysia, which has a Malay-Muslim majority.

The MILF, located in southern Philippines, seek a separate independent Malay-Muslim state ,which could then have closer economic and social ties with the neighbouring Malaysian state of Sabah, and Malaysia as a whole.

The JI on the other hand seek the formation of a Daulah Islamiah Nusantara or Nusantara Islamic State, which would encompass Malaysia ,Indonesia, the south of Thailand and the Philippines, as well as northern Australia.

Dreams of a united Malay archipelago, or “Nusantara”, go back to at least the early part of the 20^th century, when the concept was put forth by Indonesian scholars as the basis for the overthrow of Dutch and British colonial rule by Malays in Malaysia and Indonesia, which together with the Philippines, form the Nusantara. The Philippines is not often thought of as being part of the Nusantara given that its citizens are predominantly Roman Catholic.

Today, the concept of “Wawasan Nusantara” (Archipelagic Outlook ) continues to have currency in Indonesia in a modified, more limited form. The concept may be defined as the ‘oneness’ of Indonesia in terms of territory (wilayah), nationhood (bangsa), goal and spirit of struggle (tujuan dan tekad perjuangan), law (hukum), socio-cultural attributes (sosial-budaya), economy (ekonomi), and defense and security (Hankam)².

The concept of Wawasan Nusantara is a policy of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the armed forces effectiveness in implementing this policy is regularly reviewed.³

The implementation of the concept by the Indonesian Armed Forces has been explained by the Indonesian academic George Aditjondro as follows:

with PT Gunung Kijang (a subsidiary of an Indonesian military-owned business) operating in (among others, renovation projects) in the heart of Dili, it is not unlikely that elements in Indonesia would attempt to make Timor its client state ... especially TNI with their belief in the (defense of the archipelago) Wawasan Nusantaraconcept; if one part in the circle of islands breaks then the whole chain will be affected.

Thousands of foreign troops in East Timor are seen as a potential threat to the archipelago.⁴

Thus one can already see similarities between the JI objective of Daulah Islamiah Nusantara or Nusantara Islamic State and the earlier notion of concept of Nusantara, as well as its more recent form as practiced by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Further one can see that the Indonesian Armed Forces and the JI are alike in that they are both prepared to use force to achieve the dream of Nusantara.

The concept of Nusantara continues to have currency in Malaysia even if it does explicitly form part of Government policy.

The Malaysian Constitution provides for the special treatment and accords special privileges to those of Malay origin. The Constitution defines those accorded special benefits as Bumiputera (or sons of the soil) and provides that Bumiputera are those who are of the Muslim faith and who practice Malay customs and traditions.

This definition with its emphasis on Malayness is often linked to the concept of Nusantara.

For example Sultan Ahmad Shah, Sultan of the Malaysian state of Pahang has been reported as saying that it was important to protect and preserve Malay literature and culture for it “ drew forth from the istana (palace), which formed an element of Malay supremacy in the Nusantara⁵.

Given that the concept of Nusantara has been adopted in a modified form in Indonesia and given that it still finds support in Malaysia, one can see how a sense of solidarity between Malay-Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia could develop so as to include Malay-Muslims who are in the majority the southern parts Thailand and the Philippines.

The manner in which this solidarity has been expressed such that Muslim militancy in this region is encouraged is discussed in the following parts.

Malaysia ,the PULO , MILF and the JI

The Malaysian Government, via its security agencies, principally the Special Branch and the Malaysian External Intelligence Organization (ME10), or otherwise known as the Research Department of the Prime Minister’s Department) has been actively assisting the MILF with training and arms the since at least the late seventies⁶, and the PULO since at least the mid -seventies⁷.

More recently, Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has accused the government of the Malaysian state of Kelantan of providing PULO fighters with a refuge as well as allowing them to set-up jungle training camps. Although Prime Minister Thaksin was careful to say that the state government acted without the knowledge of the Malaysian Federal Government, Federal Government ministers, including Malaysian prime minister Abdullah Badawi have been strident in their condemnation of Prime Minister Thaksin’s assertions⁸. Their objections seem rather curious for the Federal Government itself has on numerous occasions condemned the government of the state of Kelantan, which is controlled by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) of promoting extreme Islamist views.

There is no evidence of direct assistance being provided the (JI), but it is interesting to note that the JI ‘s school for training in jungle warfare and explosives was located in the remote and minute town of Ulu Tiram⁹, which is also the location of the Malaysian Armed Forces Jungle Warfare Training School (PULADA) .

Furthermore, according to the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA) the JI has been conducting training camps in Malaysia since 1990.

According to the MHA’s White Paper on the JI:

Up to 1994, the training was focused mainly on maintaining physical fitness like jogging and trekking. From 1995, however, the training camps held in GUNUNG PULAI and KULAIbegan to also teach "military" skills (without firearms training). For instance, JI members were taught to make Molotov cocktails, learn knife-throwing skills, topography, jungle survival skills and trekking. In 1997, additional modules like guerrilla warfare, infiltration and ambush were included.
Around 2000, reconnaissance and observation courses were conducted in KOTA TINGGI; these classes were dubbed "urban warfare". The JI even conducted "Recall and Operation exercises" to ensure that members were operationally ready. 14 (which includes the 3 who went to Afghanistan) of the 21 arrestees participated in such training camps in Malaysia¹⁰.

Pulada is located also  at Kota Tinggi as well as Ulu Tiram¹¹and it covers an area so extensive that it may be used for the firing of rockets. Its jungle training area is said to be so large that it would not be covered in a three day-trek undertaken by combat-ready armed forces personnel.

The Gunung Pulai Recreational Reserve is also a catchment area for water supplied to Singapore.¹²Being a catchment it would be designated a security area. In any case the highest parts of Guning Pulai's 2,147 feet are restricted military areas.¹³

Civilian buildings in the area include:
a) a  Malaysian Department of Agriculture Facility¹⁴
b) A Malaysian Government operated motivational camp, Kem Kaizen, which has been used by both the ruling United Malays National Organisation ,as well as the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM).¹⁵

The three locations mentioned above, Kulai, Kota Tinggi and Ulu Tiram are all within 30-40 kms of each other.¹⁶

PULADA was originally known as the British Army’s Far East Training Centre ,and was set up in Malaya in 1948. Renamed The Jungle Warfare School in 1959, it's primary aim was to train instructors for battalions engaged in operations during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) From 1963 this emphasis changed to preparation for units serving in the Borneo Confrontation. In 1971 The Jungle Warfare School moved to Singapore when PULADA was handed over to the Malaysian Army, although the UK continued to use the facilities¹⁷.

Although there is no direct evidence of assistance in the form of training being provided the JI by the Malaysian Government at PULADA, the activities of the JI in and around PULADA does fit a pattern of Islamist terror groups being trained in or around military and other government installations in Malaysia. The MILF for example, were trained on the island of Pangkor¹⁸, of the western coast of Peninsula Malaysia, and across a narrow strait from where today is located the Royal Malaysian Navy’s Headquarters in Lumut.

Similarly, the PULO have, as Prime Minister Thakshin¹⁹has recently pointed out, often sought refuge on the Malaysian side of the Thai-Malaysia border, where the Malaysian Armed Forces have had a strong and regular presence since at least 1948, when as part of the British forces they fought the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). This fight continued into the late eighties, when the MCP officially disbanded.

Malaysia is one of the most heavily surveillanced countries in the region if not the world, and hence it would be quite difficult to make the case that the Malaysian Government was unaware of the activities of the MILF, PULO and JI so close to its military bases and installations. Therefore, at the very least, Malaysia would appear to have been a passive accomplice in the above mentioned groups activities, which include the Bali bombing.

ME10 activity has also been noted on the Cocos-Keeling Islands²⁰, which lie in the Indian Ocean to the west of Perth. It was once part of the British Settlements and administered out of Singapore. ME10 activity was noted especially in the early eighties when the predominantly Muslim Malay population were asked to decide if they wanted to become an Australian territory governed by the Australian Commonwealth Government, or remain in the control of the Clunies-Ross family. The population voted in favour of the former. However , in a recent report on John Clunies-Ross, the former owner and administrator of the island, it was noted that in the past twenty years, even as they have come under the control of the Commonwealth Government, the islanders have become more Islamic in their ways, with many of the women now wearing the headscarf, and the men skull caps²¹. There appears therefore to have been Islamic evangelisation or dakwah activity on the island.

As mentioned above, the objective of the MILF and the PULO is the creation of a separate Malay-Muslim states, whereas the JI appear more ambitious and would seek to create a Malay-Muslim empire spanning the entire region.

The Malaysian Government on the other hand, which appears to have backed all three groups, seems to have as its objective the promotion of Malaysian Malay nationalism. As mentioned above, the Malaysian Constitution defines a Malaysian Malay, or bumiputera (son of the soil) as someone of the Islamic faith and who practises the customs and traditions of the Malay race.

Therefore, in promoting Malaysian Malay nationalism, the Malaysian Government also promotes Islam.

Therefore, there is alignment between the aspirations of the Malaysian Government and the three militant groups described above.

Indonesia ,the JI and Laskar Jihad

Prime Minister Thaksin has also accused Indonesian radicals, (but not the Indonesian Government) of being part of the source of troubles in Southern Thailand.

He has been quoted as saying :

"They (PULO and southern Thai Muslim separatists ) got (their) radical ideas from studying in Indonesia or from friends in Indonesia and then trained in Indonesia and Malaysia," ²²

Here too, as is the case with Malaysia, the Indonesian government has taken offence.²³

Indonesia has already been accused of at least providing passive support for various terrorist groups, including the JI, and of course these claims have been rejected by the Indonesian Government and some academics.²⁴

More recently, the newly elected Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudyhono has declared that he will act again JI if there is proof that it exists.

However the honesty of the undertaking must be questioned in light of the following statements.

First, in May 2004, as reported in “ The Age “ :

"As an organisation, JI, I would say, does not exist in our list [of banned organisations] actually. But I do understand that men belonging to JI do exist in Indonesia. In our policy of combating terrorism we have to watch them. And if they are planning to commit crimes then we bring them to justice."²⁵

Therefore the existence of JI has already been acknowledged , yet President Susilo now claims that he does not know if it exists.

Then more recently on Australian television, the following exchange between the President and one of his advisers was recorded, and screened nationally²⁶:

PRESIDENT SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO: And if I got strong legal evidence
that Jemaah Islamiyah does exist in Indonesia, I will of course ban that organisation.

SARAH FERGUSON: But the controversial re-trial of the organisation's leader Abu Bakar Bashir, which began the day after Yudhoyono's inauguration, demonstrated how difficult that may be.

In a telling moment with an advisor Yudhoyono revealed the sensitivities of dealing with two different audiences, the Australian and the domestic.

PRESIDENT SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO: [Subtitled.] But the recent trial
couldn't prove that Abu Bakar Bashir wasn't part of Jemaah Islamiyah. And she pressed me on this point. Is this sensitive?

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: [Subtitled.] Maybe. It might be better if you didn't admit that Jemaah Islamiyah exists.

The President’s reluctance to act against the JI , and thus his tacit support for their activities, despite their implication in the Bali bombing is consistent with the manner in which the Indonesian Government has used Islam and militant Islamic groups to promote its own policy of Wawasan Nusantara and consistent with the fact that both the JI and the Indonesian Government share a common vision.

There are an increasing number of reports which suggest that the Indonesian armed forces have used militia groups who are predominantly Muslim and motivated by a desire to protect Indonesian sovereignty from attacks by the Christian west . East Timor and now West Papua are examples of this²⁷.

West Papua and Laskar Jihad

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio National reported in August 2003:

despite claims that Indonesian forces have cracked down on radical Islamists in the Indonesian province of West Papua, the separatist movement there says Laskar Jihad is still active and being supported by local Indonesian military.

In May this year, up to 10 villages in the West Papuan highlands were burned and at least 20 people were killed, in what local people claim were terrorist actions attacks by groups linked to Jemaah Islamiah.

The OPM, or West Papua Movement, says little has been done to crack down on Islamic militias in West Papua²⁸.

The report quoted John Ondawame of the OPM as saying that the Laskar Jihad trained local militias, and that the Indonesian military has close links with the Laskar Jihad, as well as the pro-Indonesian militia in West Papua.

Islam and East Timor

Islamisation as tool for integrating the predominantly Roman Catholic East Timorese into Indonesia has been well documented .

For example in 1989, about 14 years after Indonesia took over East Timor from Portugal, Amnesty International, Asia Watch and U.S. lawmakers were reported to have accused the Indonesian government of forcing the residents of the island to practice Islam²⁹.

Then in 1998, the BBC reported³⁰:

the Vatican is committed to a "strong support" for Timorese Catholics and wants to affirm the rights of the church's followers both in the former Portuguese colony and in Indonesia where the very aggressive spread of Islam is worrying the Holy See.

The "forced Islamization" of the Timorese had already been highlighted by Timorese Bishop Dom Ximenes Belo, during his recent visit to the Vatican. Islam's relationship with other religions has been acquiring new characteristics, not there in the past, such as attacks on 120 Indonesian Catholic churches, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, told(then Portuguese Foreign Minister) Jaime Gama. Hence the preservation of the rights of Catholics in this region is a priority for the church.

Quoting Bishop Belo, The Age of Melbourne ,Australia reported³¹:

He says the young are pessimistic about the past and future and are frustrated by the lack of jobs and what he refers to as ``the political dimension of our daily life''. Timorese culture, he says, is being stifled: the Timorese language is not taught in schools, Islam is being actively promoted and there is a growing influx of Indonesian settlers under the policies of ``Indonisation''

The Bishop also told Tempo of Indonesia in an on-line interview in 1996 monitored by the BBC:

[Q] Was it true that prior to integration, Islam-Catholic relations ran smoothly?

[A] Obviously, there was no strong pressure [preceding word in English] like now. From 1974 to 1978, the people in the villages were forced to convert to Islam. If they refused to do so, they were considered communists. If they were communists, they would not be able to remain alive. This happened in almost every village in East Timor

It should be said that Indonesia has always denied these allegations, but the weight of evidence would appear to be against the denials.³²

Therefore, at least in this region, terror appears to have been used as a tool to promote the Islamic faith, nationalism, and notions of racial individuality, that is the notion that the Malays are a race ought to be one, and asserts themselves against other racial or religious groups in the region. This notion has not yet manifested itself as one of racial supremacy, and I will not make any further comment on the matter in this paper.

Hence, it would appear that in this region, the motives are localised . However, Malaysia and Indonesia are both linked to the international Muslim community, and these links have manifested themselves in some of the activities described above. For example, the Libyan government provided funds to the MILF via the Malaysian Government. Further the MILF were supported in their cause by the Organization of Islamic Conferences who officially endorsed the MILF’s cause via a declaration in the early 70s³³.

Financing terror and the provision of other infrastructure in Indonesia

The analysis this far shows at least passive support by both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments for Islamic terrorist groups operating within their borders.

In the case of the Indonesian Government there even appears to be active collaboration.

The provision of infrastructure , if nothing else land on which to live and train undisturbed is itself sufficient to enable terrorist groups to carry out their activities.

The cases of Malaysia and Indonesia appear however to be different in that Malaysia appears to have become a center for terrorist activities outside its own borders.

Indonesia on the other hand has used its resources to finance Islamic and other movements within the country in an effort to promote its own policy of Wawasan Nusantara and the method of using legitimate business fronts to finance these efforts has been documented by the Indonesian academic George Aditjondro. ³⁴

Given the international repercussions of Malaysia’s assistance to and role in providing the structures that would enable terrorist financing, the rest of this paper will be concerned primarily with Malaysia.

Malaysia as a center for terrorism financing

Given the above outline, I now describe a financing structure which has developed in this region, and which appears to be linked to the Malaysian Government, primarily via its dakwah foundation , as well as Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi. The latter has been declared a terrorist pursuant to the US Executive Order 13224 ,on the grounds that he is among Al-Qaeda’s main financiers.

There is now evidence that Malaysia appears to be providing the same support in the area of terrorist financing, that is, providing a safe refuge for terrorist funds despite it being party to the ARF declaration of 30 July 2002.

The story of Commercial IBT Pty Ltd (CIBT)

CIBT is a proprietary company which started life as Everich Trading (Aust) Pty Ltd in 1988. It then changed its name to Commercial Banktrust Pty Ltd, then Commercial BT Pty Ltd, and finally Commercial IBT Pty Ltd in 2002.³⁵

Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) records show that between April 2002 and 2004, CIBT’s shareholders were two companies. One of the two, RG Investment Management Pty Ltd, is also incorporated in Australia and had a paid–up capital of just A$ 2 . This was later increased to A$50,000.

The other, QI LLC, appears to be incorporated in California ,with its principal business being listed in a Dun and Bradstreet search as being off-set printing.

Documents lodged with ASIC as at 30 July 2004 disclosed that Commercial IBT's issued and paid up capital was AU$2,209,930,550 (AU$2.2 billion)

CIBT was also registered with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, as a registered financial corporation pursuant to section 8 of the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 .It was only later in June 2004 that APRA caused the name of the corporation and other particulars relating to the corporation to be removed from its register; and that the corporation ceased to be a registered entity within the meaning of subsection 5(3) of the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001.

Incorporation under ASIC’s rules and regulations, as well the entry of its name onto the APRA register then allowed CIBT to make an application to the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority ( LOFSA ) for an off-shore banking license.

LOFSA is a Malaysian Government authority which has jurisdiction over the Labuan Offshore Financial Centre, located on the island of Labuan, which lies just of the coast of the state of Sabah, on the island of Borneo.

LOFSA itself comes under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Since 1998, the Prime Minister has also been Finance Minister.

LOFSA requires that applicants for off-shore banking licenses meet the following minimum criteria³⁶: -

1. • Be already a bank or financial institution;
2. • Possess sound track record;
3. • Accorded a good credit rating by acceptable rating agencies;
4. • Supervised by a competent regulatory authority; and
5. •Conform to generally accepted standards of international banking practices or BIS, as the case may be.

In order to meet the requirement of a good credit rating by an acceptable rating agency, CIBT approached Rating Agency of Malaysia Bhd (RAM).

RAM issued a rating report in May 2002, which can be summarized as follows:

RAM has assigned respective long- and short-term ratings of AA1 and P1 to Commercial BT Pty Limited (“Commercial BT” or “the Bank”). The ratings reflect the stand-alone credit risk of Commercial BT.

Commercial BT is an Australian-based investment bank which primarily focuses on general investment, corporate advisory services and investment banking activities. The main strength of the Bank lies in its solid balance sheet.

Commercial BT, by virtue of its extensive business in the Asia-Pacific region, is also a member of the Asian Bankers Association (“ABA”). Members of ABA comprise financial institutions that are based or have operations in Asia and the Australia-Pacific region. Commercial BT has total assets of US$8.12 billion and has world-wide representation, with a staff strength of 150 employees.

Commercial BT is fully owned by 8 shareholders. The Bank adheres to the ‘Australian

Standards on Substantial Shareholding in Banking and Financial Corporations’

whereby its respective shareholders do not hold more than 15% of its equity. All the

shareholders are corporate and institutional entities, which include fund managers, trust

funds and investment corporations. Some of the shares in the Bank are held in trust on

behalf of the shareholders and the Bank has strict agreements with its shareholders to

protect their confidentiality and privacy.

RAM describes itself as embodying the Malaysian Central Bank’s intention to promote transparency and instill confidence in the Malaysian capital market³⁷.Its chairman and chief executive , C.Rajendram is a former senior official of the Central Bank.

The AA1 and P1 ratings accorded CIBT ranked it along side the Malaysian subsidiary of HSBC Ltd, and above that of ABN Amro.

LOFSA issued CIBT a license to operate a full deposit taking bank in Labuan sometime in late 2002. LOFSA , in its annual report for the year ended 31 December 2002 states that Commercial IBT, together with Macquarie Bank Ltd, also of Australia, were the two organizations that year which were granted deposit taking licenses.

CIBT in business

Upon being granted the license by LOFSA, CIBT issued a press release which was published in Malaysian business dailies. The stories amongst other things quoted CIBT’s president director Dr Adrian Ong saying that Labuan was specifically chosen because it is well regarded internationally for its stringent regulatory regime, competitive rates and infrastructure.³⁸

By this time CIBT was advertising itself on its website as being a full licensed bank in Labuan Malaysia involved in all aspects of banking and investment banking including receiving deposits, corporate finance and advisory, private banking, trade finance and fund and asset management. The headquarters of Commercial IBT Bank however, was listed on the website as being in Melbourne, Australia.

It described its activities in Australia as being that of a private investment bank and a registered financial institution with the Reserve Bank of Australia under the Financial Corporations Act 1974 and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority.³⁹

Soon after , in September 2004 a member of the opposition in the Malaysian Parliament, Husham Musa, raised questions about CIBT’s business and standing both in Malaysia and Australia. He contended, amongst other things, that CIBT was not a bank as defined by LOFSA , and hence should not have been granted the license it had in Labuan.

The Government, via the Finance Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Hashim Ismail responded by saying that CIBT had only been issued an investment banking license, and that there was therefore no need for it to be a bank in its own jurisdiction in order that it be granted a licence by LOFSA.

However as mentioned earlier, LOFSA’s own annual report of 2002, which must be tabled before Parliament explicitly states that CIBT was issued a license to operate a deposit taking bank.

On August 6 2004, ASIC announced that it had obtained orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria appointing a Provisional Liquidator to Commercial IBT Pty Ltd (Commercial IBT)⁴⁰.

In making its application, ASIC alleged that Commercial IBT had not provided accurate and consistent information to Australian regulators. In support of this contention, ASIC submitted that Commercial IBT had provided or reported inconsistent financial data and reports to ASIC, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the Australian Taxation Office, an Australian bank, and foreign regulatory authorities and rating agencies.

In addition, ASIC said that it was concerned that Commercial IBT had inadequate accounting and financial reporting measures in place and had failed to keep proper books and records.

ASIC's application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator to Commercial IBT was supported by APRA.

On 12 November 2004 ASIC announced that it had obtained orders in the Supreme Court of Victoria winding up Kantoch Pty Ltd, formerly known as Commercial IBT Pty Ltd (Commercial IBT).

RAM has suspended the CIBT rating , pending the outcome of the ASIC investigation, but has yet to actually revoke it. This is despite the fact that CIBT’s shareholders cancelled the corporation’s shares and reduced its paid-up capital to just $2, just after ASIC gave notice that would be making an application to wind-up the company⁴¹.

LOFSA on the other hand, has yet to take any action against CIBT, and has allowed for the company to continue operating its bank in Labuan.

All this taken together with the fact that LOFSA and the Malaysian Ministry of Finance attempted to mislead the public on the issue of the actual license granted CIBT leads to one of two possible conclusions; the first , that Malaysian authorities are involved in a massive cover-up, or two, there is for some reason an unwillingness to act against CIBT even when there is evidence of suspicious dealings .

Evidence of links to Yassin Al-Qadi

When the member of the opposition in the Malaysian Parliament , Husham Musa , raised questions about CIBT’s business in the Malaysian Parliament, he was almost immediately approached by a Malay-Muslim businessman by the name of Wan Hasni Wan Sulaiman, ( who lives and works in Kuala Lumpur,) asking him to stop probing into CIBT’s affairs.

Wan Hasni and business partner Dr Rahim Ghouse, also of Malaysia but who now lives and works in Melbourne, remain shareholders in a Malaysian incorporated company called Abrar Group Sdn Bhd. The CEO and controlling shareholder of that company is Sheik Yassin Al-Qadi. Wan Hasni and Rahim Ghouse are no longer board members.

Despite having his assets frozen in the US and the UK as a result of being named in Executive Order 13224, Al-Kadi remains a shareholder and as CEO, in charge of the company in Malaysia. He has been given permanent residence there⁴².

A subsidiary of that company, Abrar Discounts, is a major financier of Malaysian corporations.

It appears therefore that Al-Qadi’s assets have been given shelter by the Malaysian Government.

Both Ghouse and Wan Hasni never had resources of their own, and are not thought of as being independently wealthy but for the capital provided them by Al-Qadi, and a slew of finance industry related licences provided them by the former Malaysian deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, when he was still Minister for Finance. Ghouse remains, as he has been since 1998, a director and spokesperson of the International Free Anwar Campaign. (The organisation now concerns itself with returning Anwar to power).

Anwar Ibrahim himself has been linked to terrorist financing, as a consequence of his directorship of the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The IIIT is suspected of financing, amongst others, the Palestinian Jihad. Anwar founded the IIIT with a number of others who have known to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood⁴³.

Anwar’s entry into mainstream politics was as a result of the intervention of the late Ismail Faruqi, who was also known to have links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to his entry into mainstream politics Anwar was better known as the young Islamic radical who founded the Malaysian Muslim Youth Force, or Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) .

More recently Anwar has spoken in support of Sheik Yusof Al-Qaradawy, after the latter was refused entry to Germany. Al-Qaradawy is already barred from entering the United States as a result of his support for HAMAS.

Wan Hasni is considered the key man in Commercial IBT, and is known to be the person who makes all appointments within CIBT. Both Wan Hasni and Rahim Ghouse have admitted on camera to having met with Dr Adrian Ong, CIBT’s CEO. (Recall that Wan Hasni has done more than just meet with Adrian Ong, he has also attempted to prevent investigation into the company).

Wan Hasni had planned on using CIBT to guarantee bonds that another company he controlled, One Capital Ltd of Hong Kong would issue and trade internationally. These plans appear to have fallen through as a result of the investigation into CIBT’s activities.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, One Capital Ltd provides an interesting link. A search of that company shows that sometime in April 2003, about the same time Wan Hasni resigned from the board of Abrar, he and the other shareholder in One Capital, Satria Suetoh (formerly of Abrar, but now regional director of the US medical software company Cerner) transferred their shares to two Hong Kong nationals .Its would appear that the Hong Kong nationals act as nominees⁴⁵.

Queries were emailed One Capital concerning their business in Malaysia, and these were answered by a junior employee. A search of records at MyNIC, the Malaysian Internet registry of the IP number on the email received in response from One Capital showed the IP number to be registered in the name of the Malaysian Foundation for the Propagation of the Islamic Faith or Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia(YADIM).

YADIM is a Malaysian Government sponsored body formed in 1974 to act as an umbrella body for all Islamic evangelisation bodies in Malaysia. It also reports to the Office of the Prime Minister, as do the MEIO, LOFSA and the Central Bank.

Rahim Ghouse in Australia - a connection to the Madrid bombing

Rahim Ghouse is today general manager in charge of the operations of the Muslim Community Cooperative of Australia. He has been involved with the Cooperative since at least 2002.

The Cooperative says that Ghouse’s duties include bringing to the Cooperative his contacts in the international capital markets.

In September this year, at about the same time that ASIC moved against CIBT, the MCCA announced that it had secured AUD 500 million for a home equity housing loan scheme. Such a scheme is run as an alternative to the interest charged mortgage loans provided by other financiers but which are prohibited to Muslims. A scheme such as this was promoted by the Australian Government to make housing more affordable but failed to find backers. The MCCA on the other hand claim to have found a major local wholesale financier to back their scheme, but have so far refused to provide details as to the financier’s identity.

The MCCA came to public attention in late 2003, when it was reported that it was the owner of a rural property where Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohammed Omran lived.

Sheikh Omran came to public attention last year when it was reported that the Melbourne-based cleric appeared to have links with terror suspect Abu Dahdah, who is being held in Spain.

Abu Dahdah, also known as Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, is a Syrian who has been jailed since 2001 and thought to be a major operative for Al Qaeda . He has been identified as the prime mover behind the March 11 terror attacks in Madrid.

Ghouse has denied any involvement in Yassin Al-Qadi’s Abrar Group since at least 1998.⁴⁶

However , as recently as in late December, Rahim, as head of the MCCA, sponsored a series of seminars in Australia on Islamic banking, at which the main speaker was the chief executive of Abrar Discounts, Wan Abdul Rahim Kamil.⁴⁷

Malaysia’s other mentions in the war against terror

The above description of facts and analysis of the Malaysian Government’s reaction to the instances when terrorist financiers and terrorist groups have been found to have been operating in the country should be viewed in light of recent instances where Malaysia has featured in various investigations commenced in conjunction with the war against terror.

These instances are as follows:

a) Malaysia as meeting place for the 9-11 mission

As reported by TIME⁴⁸:

The Malaysian link to the September 11 attacks can be discerned in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the Frenchman of Moroccan descent now in custody in Virginia — the so-called 20th hijacker. Not only did Moussaoui make several visits to Malaysia, U.S. sources inform TIME that while there he was provided with a letter supporting a cover identity as a marketing consultant for a Malaysian company. The letter also guaranteed that Moussaoui would be paid $35,000 for his services. It was provided by Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain and trusted lieutenant of a militant Islamic cleric in neighboring Indonesia long associated with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan…On orders from the Indonesian cleric, Yazid had also played host in January 2000 to two of the 9/11 hijackers during their visit to Kuala Lumpur, and also to the roommate of a third and at least one of the suspects in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.

b) Malaysia as a center for the purchase and distribution of arms and bomb-making chemicals.

Again as reported by TIME:

In regards to bomb making

Yazid is currently being detained by the Malaysian authorities for, among other things, ordering four tons of ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer that can be used as a bomb-making ingredient. (Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh used only one ton to devastating effect.) The fertilizer was ostensibly headed for the city-state of Singapore, which lies at the tip of the Malay peninsula.

In regards to arms

The region's most notorious and violent radical Islamic groups still regularly gather in Malaysia to meet with their al Qaeda backers — and with the region's long-established weapons smugglers.

Says "Mat," a pony-tailed Indonesian who has been trading illegal arms for 20 years, "These groups use the internet to set up the venue and date for their meetings. The messages are sent in encrypted codes." If a local radical group wants weapons, they place an order and al Qaeda will pay for it. Malaysia, he says, "is their favorite place to have meetings with the other radical Islamic groups in the region."

Among the radical groups partly funded by al Qaeda who meet regularly with arms smugglers in Malaysia are the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front from the neighboring Philippines, the Laskar Jihad and the separatist Free Aceh Movement of Indonesia, and Malaysia's own Kumpulan Mujahideen.

According to sources at all levels of the clandestine arms trade in Southeast Asia, meetings between representatives of Islamic groups and their al Qaeda financiers continue to take place in Malaysia — sometimes several a month, in cheap hotels and guest houses outside Kuala Lumpur, in the beach resort of Port Dickson, and in the cities of Malacca and Johore Baru across the straits from Singapore. The country, in the words of one U.S. official, is "a perfect place for terrorist R-and-R."

The effectiveness of the arms procurement system is made clear by a spokesman for the fundamentalist Free Aceh Movement. Agreeing to talk only by telephone and refusing to give even a nickname, the 10-year veteran of the murderous struggle whose wife and three children have all been killed in the fighting says that he regularly places orders with arms syndicates for hundreds of weapons: M-16 and AK-47 automatic rifles, handguns and ammunition. Following a well-worn trail, the weapons are bought in Thailand, sent down to Malaysia and then carried by boats through the Straits of Malacca to the Indonesian island of Sumatra, where Aceh is located.

Payment is taken care of by sympathizers, such as al-Qaeda. "My job is only to place orders with the arms brokers," he says. "When the weapons arrive, I will be notified."

c) Malaysia as a place for Al-Qaeda business activities and charities

Abuza has provided a detailed analysis of how Malaysia had become a base for JI and Al-Qaeda front companies, and he notes “ that the most important (Al-Qaeda) front companies were established by JI's Malaysian cell.”

In regards to charities he tells us :

Al Qaeda established a number of other charities in the region. In Malaysia, Hambali, established a charity, Pertubuhan al Ehasan, in 1998, in order to fund jihad activities in the Malukus. The charity remained open until its closure in 2002 and in total raised Rp500,000 (roughly US$200,000).37 The money went to purchasing weapons, training, clothing and feeding recruits for the jihads in the Malukus and Poso. Much of the money came from donors within Malaysia, though foreign donors were solicited through the Internet

d) Malaysia as a venue for the production of weapons

As reported by AP⁴⁹:

A Sri Lankan accused of being the chief financial officer for an international nuclear black market sat on the board of a company owned by the Malaysian prime minister's only son, according to documents obtained by The Associated Press.

In the Malaysian case, the partners said they had no idea deals were being made to fashion parts that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

The documents, obtained by AP via searches of publicly accessible files, reveal a paper trail through privately held and publicly listed companies that outlines ties between the prime minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, and the Sri Lankan, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, as well as his Malaysian wife.

The documents show that the men were top executives at Kaspadu Sdn. Bhd. when Tahir negotiated a deal for a company linked to Kaspadu, Scomi Precision Engineering, to build components that Western intelligence agencies allege were for use in Libya's nuclear program.

In all of the above instances , the Malaysian Government has either claimed ignorance of the facts or claimed that their investigations showed the Malaysian parties to be unaware of any nefarious intent.

There are however a number of issues that throw doubt over these claims.

First, there is evidence that the Malaysian Government is not only aware of arms dealers operating a black market in the country, but is also involved with them.

To begin with that there exists such a large and active network of illegal arms dealers in Malaysia, and that Malaysia is the favoured locale for such a trade is surprising to say the least for Malaysia has very strict rules that govern the use and possession of firearms.Unlicensed possession of firearms can result in the imposition of the death penalty under the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971.

This Act is strictly enforced ,and a number of persons have been either jailed or hanged under its provisions.

Thus, the question of whether the trade is conducted with the tacit approval of the Malaysian Government.

In his autobiography, the former leader of the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) , Chin Peng, gives this account of negotiations with Rahim Noor, the then head of the Special Branch, and later Inspector General of Police⁵⁰:

…..I told him…I am proposing that the CPM sell (its surplus arms of about 3,000 pieces) back to the black market dealers …Rahim Noor quickly responded “Why not sell it to the Malaysian Government?”

I indicated I felt this would be unwise…..the government (could later) claim that this was war booty captured from the communists.

Rahim Noor came back swiftly with an alternative. ”We could send merchants to purchase these weapons directly from you.”

Therefore, the above would suggest that the Malaysian Government is not only aware of the trade , but is an active participant in it.

In regards to Scomi and the supply of centrifuges to Libya, there are a number of factors that would have brought the matter to the Malaysian Government’s attention.

First, the Malaysian Government’s own detention orders, issued for the detention of BSA Tahir in mid-2004, allege that⁵¹:

in June 2002, Mr Tahir arranged for four Libyan technicians to participate in a weeklong "secret" training stint at Scomi's plant outside Kuala Lumpur on how to operate three types of machines the order says are used in the production of centrifuge components. In September 2002, Mr. Tahir arranged for an additional three Libyan technicians to take a similar course…...

The secretiveness of the training provided the Libyans must be questioned for the Malaysian Police admit knowledge of the fact.

Further, Malaysia has quite stringent visa requirements, so stringent that foreign researchers (including academics) must seek special permission from the country’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs before they can lawfully conduct research in the country.

In addition, Malaysia has a system of permits and licenses which require that practically every form of business activity be approved by some Government Ministry.

Therefore, on balance it is more likely than not that the Government was in fact aware of the exact nature of use of the centrifuges produced by Scomi.

In regards to the use of Malaysia as place from which funds are disbursed throughout the region by Al-Qaeda and others, it should be noted that Malaysian Central Bank Regulations have always (even prior to the imposition of capital controls in September 1998) required that all remittances above RM 10,000 be reported by the remitting bank to the Central Bank. Malaysia would therefore hardly seem the ideal place from which to conduct such activities, unless there is the understanding that the authorities would not be a concern.

Malaysia’s position in regards to its international obligations

The above would suggest that the Malaysian Government has in fact provided at the very least the infrastructure that would allow Muslim militants to operate in the region.

In regards to terrorist financing, Malaysia does appear to have provided Yassin Al-Qadi a safe haven from which he can continue to invest his funds.

The matter of Yassin Al-Qadi using Malaysia as his base has been given wide-spread publicity as a result of a story aired here in Australia by the SBS television station , on their Dateline programme, on October 20, 2003.The story was reported widely in Malaysia, as well as internationally. Yet, Malaysia has not taken any action to freeze Al-Kadi’s assets, nor withdraw the license issued CIBT which appears to be linked to him.

All this inaction seems to fly in the face of the ARF Declaration of 30 July 2002, as well as agreements entered into with Australia⁵², as well as the United States⁵³, to cooperate in the activities aimed at curtailing terrorist financing.

Yet despite what appears to be active participation in international fora aimed at curtailing terrorist financing, Malaysia has not actually become a signatory to some key treaties. For example, as of late April this year Malaysia had yet to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism⁵⁴. (the position does not appear to have changed at the time of writing) .Neither does it appear to have ratified UNSCR 1267, by which the Security Council obliges all States to freeze the assets, prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment with regard to the individuals/entities included on the list.⁵⁵

Yassin Al-Qadi is included, at number 33, in the consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to or associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda organisations, as established and maintained by the 1267 committee.⁵⁶

However, in regards to UNSCR 1373, which requires States to take certain specified measures to combat terrorism, including freezing without delay funds, financial assets or other economic resources of persons who commit, attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts; and to deny safe haven to those who
finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts; and, to ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts is brought to justice, Malaysia appears to be more proactive.

Apart from joining with other ASEAN nations in the ARF Declaration of 30 July 2002,⁵⁷
Malaysia’s representative to the United Nations has recently informed the Security Council that Malaysia has fulfilled all its obligations as stated in paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001). The Council was informed that Malaysia had submitted its fourth report on 17 September 2004 in response to the queries put forth by the Committee.⁵⁸

This may however be a case of form over substance. Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 established a Committee of the Security Council to monitor implementation of that resolution and called on all States to report to the Committee on the steps taken to implement the resolution.

The following paragraphs give guidance for the submission of such reports: 

1. 1.1.   Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 established a Committee of the Security Council to monitor implementation of that resolution and called on all States to report to the Committee on the steps taken to implement the resolution. The following paragraphs give guidance for the submission of such reports.

2. 1.2.   In compiling their reports, States should aim to demonstrate concisely and clearly, by reference to the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001), the legislative and executive (i.e. administrative or non-legislative) measures in place or contemplated to give effect to the resolution, and the other efforts they are making in the areas covered by the resolution.

3. 1.3.   The Committee may seek further information or clarification from States as necessary on the content of the reports. The Committee may draw to the attention of the Security Council any cases of States which, in the Committee’s view, need to enhance their efforts to implement fully resolution 1373 (2001).

4. 1.4.   States, if they wish, may identify areas in which they require additional guidance or technical assistance on implementing resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee will explore the capacity of States and international organisations to offer such assistance.

The above are only guidelines ,and more importantly they simply require that the states outline what they plan to do to give effect to the objectives of UNSCR 1373.

States are not required to present details of legislation they might introduce to achieve those objectives ,and hence it is possible for states to issue broad statements of intent, but either not legislate or legislate in a manner which would allow activities contrary to the spirit of UNSCR 1373 to continue unabated.

Using the case of Malaysia as an example, as noted above Malaysia does not appear to have ratified UNSCR 1267. Therefore, Malaysia has not acknowledged that Yassin Al-Qadi is a person whose assets ought to be frozen.

Hence , Malaysia could , if challenged on its inaction in regards to Al-Kadi, argue that under its laws, there is no evidence that Al-Kadi is a person who, in the words of UNSCR 1373, participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts and who ought to be brought to justice, or whose funds should be frozen.

Such a reaction is not, it is submitted , beyond the realms of probability given Malaysia’s reaction to Prime Minister Thakshin’s complaint that that PULO soldiers have been trained in Malaysia. Malaysia’s reaction to the statement, despite her history of providing support to groups such as PULO (outlined above ) has been quite predictably, to feign ignorance and anger that Prime Minister Thakshin should have chosen not to use diplomatic channels to raise the issue.⁵⁹

Conclusion

It would appear that both Malaysia and Indonesia will continue to remain safe havens for Muslim terrorists. In addition, Malaysia is likely to remain a safe haven for the assets of such groups, despite the various UN treaties and bilateral agreements that Malaysia has outwardly shown support for ,and entered into.

Therefore, it would appear that unless pressure is exerted , either overtly or covertly in the international arena by concerned nations, which could include the threat of trade sanctions , these two countries are likely to remain important bases of terrorist financing and training.

Put in another way, an attitude of zero tolerance for terrorist related activities is required, and that attitude should be communicated to both countries in the strongest possible terms. The use of sanctions may be a necessary last resort ,and can prove effective given their dependence of foreign trade and investment.

http://www.mggpillai.com/sections.php3?op=viewarticle&artid=8889

1 http://www.aseansec.org/12001.htm

2 Dedi Supriadi Adhuri; Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective; Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program, ANU, Working Paper # 48

Located at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/rmap/Wpapers/rmap_wp48.pdf

3PEMAPARAN

PADA RAKORBANGPUS TAHUN 2003

LEMBAGA KETAHANAN NASIONAL RI.

Located at http://www.bppt.go.id/rakorbangnas03/LEMHANAS.pdf

4 East Timorese becoming guests in their own land, Jakarta Post 2 February 2001

5 MALAY CULTURE, LITERATURE MUST BE PRESERVED, SAYS SULTAN Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 10 May 2004

6 see statements on the archived MILF websites ;

http://web.archive.org/web/20011201225955/209.15.161.136/cl/mnlf/

The first members of the MNLF were drawn from 90 Moro youth that under went secret military training in Malaysia in 1968. These young Moros (that included Misuari himself) had a secular education and some had briefly participated in radical including left-wing student politics in Manila in the late 1960's. They were dissatisfied with the traditional Moro leadership, which they accused of betraying Moro interest. Since its founding, the MNLF's goal was an independent Bangsamoro Homeland. However, due to pressure from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), it has opted for autonomy within the Republic of the Philippines since the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.

Also statements on the current website ; see http://www.bangsamoro.com/bmoro/moro_rebellion_rise.php, which states inter alia:

"Before the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, the Moro traditional or

aristocratic leaders, the likes of Cong. Rashid Lucman, Ex-Sen. Salipada Pendatun and Ex-Gov. Datu Udtog Matalam, were still very powerful. As a matter of fact, the first batch of ninety Moro trainees known as the "Top 90" who were sent to Sabah or, more precisely, to Palau Pangkor, State of Perak, Malaysia, for intensive military training or guerrilla warfare...."

See also http://web.archive.org/web/20020618141617/www.mnlf.net/OIC/OIC_AllResolutions.htm; http://mnlf.net/Articles/Philippine%20n%20Malaysian%20Colonialism.htm. And http://www.c-r.org/accord/min/accord6/profiles.shtml

7 Information obtained from interviews with former Australian security service personnel.

8The Star,” Unfair for Thaksin to make claims, say party leaders” Monday December 20, 2004

located at http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2004/12/20/nation/9706935&sec=nation,

also AFP;PM Abdullah denies Thai Muslim insurgents train in Malaysia: report;19 December 2004.

Located at http://news.catcha.com/my/content.phtml?1&010&&afpnews.cgi&cat=malaysia&story=041219043657.7hhc254d.txt

9 JASBANT SINGH, Associated Press ; Bali Suspects Used Malaysia As Base, 4 December 2002;and:

Melvin Singh; TERRORIST SCHOOL IN JOHOR, The New Paper ,1 Dec 2002; located at http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/printfriendly/0,4139,8982-1038758340,00.html

10 Home Affairs Singapore-JI White Paper, located at http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=550&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0&mode=arc

11 http://www.vic-info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/0/5e053de3e330e05e0a256b57007e2330/$FILE/040412-P-Malaysia-web.doc

12 http://app.info.gov.sg/data/p_art_JohorMayStopBuyingWaterFromSporeByAugust_100204.html

13 http://www.expatsingapore.com/travel/SM1.htm

14 http://agrolink.moa.my/doa/english/dev_proj/pulai.html).

15 (see www.abimjohor.org.my/program.htm

16 LOCATION MAP and CALCULATION OF DISTANCES:

For Johor generally see:http://encarta.msn.com/map_701513517/Johor_Baharu.html

Ulu Tiram and Kota Tinggi are to the north-east of Johor Baharu

Kulai and Gunung Pulai are not shown on map above, but are to the  nor-nor west, roughly above the town of Senai (where the Senai Airport is located)

For a map of Kulai ,see:http://kulai.net/info/map/

Location (latitude and longitude)

Ulu Tiram    Negeri Johor 1.6          103.8166667
Gunung Pulai Negeri Johor 1.6          103.55
Kota Tinggi  Negeri Johor 1.7333333    103.9
Kulai        Negeri Johor 1.6666667    103.6

Approximate distance:-Ulu Tiram/Gunung Pulai=30 km
Approximate distance:-Kota Tinggi/Gunung Pulai=42 km

Figures obtained, respectively; from:www.indexmundi.com/zp/my/14340.htm
www.indexmundi.com/zm/my/1420.htm
www.indexmundi.com/zp/my/11260.htm
www.indexmundi.com/zp/my/11360.htm

Distances calculated using :http://www.csgnetwork.com/lldistcalc.html

17 http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/INFBATTSCH/junglewarfarewing/

18See note 2, link http://www.bangsamoro.com/bmoro/moro_rebellion_rise.php,

19 see note 4

20 see note 3

21 ABC Dynasties ;The Clunies-Ross family; located at: http://www.abc.net.au/dynasties/ep02.htm

22 The Jakarta Post,” Indonesia regrets Thaksin's comments on radical groups”, December 21, 2004, located at http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20041221.B02&irec=9

23 see note 10.,

also ABC Asia Pacific , “Indonesia calls on Thailand to explain unrest allegations”

http://abcasiapacific.com/news/stories/asiapacific_stories_1269392.htm

24 see for example paper by Greg Fealy of the Australian National University , located at http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit71/fealy1.htm

25By Peter Hartcher and Matthew Moore in Jakarta, “Jakarta rising star coy on JI ban”: May 17, 2004

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/16/1084646074110.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true

26 see http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/cover_stories/transcript_1683.asp for full transcript

27 See for example http://www.worldevangelical.org/persec_papua_03dec03.html, http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0406/040613.htm, http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/Should-the-US-Resume-Military-Ties.htm, http://www.freewestpapua.com/indepth_inbedwithterror.html, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31402

see also SCHULZE ,KE, The Brown Journal of World Affairs

“Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon”, Spring 2002 – Volume IX, Issue 1located at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/9.1/Indonesia/Schulze.pdf

28 Fundamentalist Islamic militant groups active in West Papua
      By Hamish Fitzsimmons, ABC Local Radio
      Aug 27, 2003, 11:50       
This is a transcript from The World Today. The program is broadcast around Australia at 12:10pm on ABC Local Radio.

29 Pope Preaches On Wartorn East Timor
12 October 1989, The San Francisco Chronicle

30 Vatican backs Timor Catholics, concerned over "aggressiveness" of Islam. 291 words
11 March 1998BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific

31 A Figure Of Courage In The Midst Of East Timor's Agony

Mark Baker
1,059 words
17 November 1993The Age

32 See for example: JAKARTA ADMITS EAST TIMOR 'ERRORS' BUT TRIES TO SHIFT BLAME. By Nicholas Cumming-Bruce in Jakarta.
11 April 1994The Guardian
THE Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, acknowledged "mistakes" by his government in East Timor but sought at the weekend to blame "political agitators" for prolonging the conflict over the territory which Indonesia annexed in 1975. Mr Alatas also dismissed charges that Indonesia is seeking to impose Islam on East Timor's predominantly Roman Catholic population, calling the allegation an attempt to find a "rallying cry: Catholics of the world rise against Indonesia".

33 see Note 2 ,also Zachary Abuza;” Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network” Contemporary Southeast Asia December 1, 2002(ISEAS)

34 see Financing Human Rights Violations in Indonesia, By George J. Aditjondro

located at http://www.koteka.net/part1.htm.

See also Note 4 above.

35 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) company search

36 See http://www.lofsa.gov.my/lofsa5/labiofc/offbank/guidebank.pdf

37 http://www.ram.com.my/article.cfm?id=26

38 Sadna Saifuddin” Commercial IBT Bank opens Labuan branch” , 5 April 2003 Business Times

39 see archived CIBT website at http://web.archive.org/web/20030410055226/www.cibtbank.com/about.htm

40 See ASIC press release at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf/byheadline/04-370+ASIC+winds+up+Australian-based+Malaysian+bank?openDocument

41 see Note 1

42 Dun and Bradstreet search current as of May 2004

43 see story at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/53888/1/.html

44 Interview, stock market dealer and analyst , Malaysia

45 HK company search

46Anwar, institute linked to overseas terror group - Aussie TV report, Bernama, 23 October 2003, located at

http://www.mca.org.my/story.asp?file=/articles/news/2003/10/25/19027.html&sec=In+The+News. Readers attention is drawn to the last paragraph that reads:

Rahim said he had no dealings with Sheikh Yassin since leaving Malaysia for Australia in 1998. "I left all these matters to Dr Wan Hasni on all the matters of Abrar," he said. -

47 http://islamicsydney.com/story.php?id=1925

48SIMON ELEGANT, Malaysia: Staging Ground for Terror?
How a Southeast Asian nation became a favorite meeting place for al Qaeda and its allies  Feb. 02, 2002,located at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,198859,00.html

49“Paper trail shows Malaysia ties”

located at http://us.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/18/nuclear.malaysia.ap/

50 Chin Peng; “alias Chin Peng;My Side of History,” (2004) at page 496

51Leslie Lopez, “Libyans Got Nuclear Training at Malaysian Company, Police Say “The Wall Street Journal
4 June 2004

52 see http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/Page/News_Media_2003_Media_Statements_Media_Releases_1st_Quarter_04_February_2003_Australia_and_Malaysia_join_to_fight_money_laundering_and_the_financing_of_terrorism

53 -http://www.kln.gov.my/english/Fr-foreignaffairs.htm

54 Patterns of Global Terrorism -2003;Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 29, 2004; East Asia Overview. Located at

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31611.htm

55 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm

56 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/pdflist.pdf

57 see note 1

58 see http://www.un.int/malaysia/SC/2004/SCTerrorism%2019%20OCT04.pdf

59Amy Kazmin, “Thaksin's terror claims anger Malaysia”, The Financial Times, London, December 20 2004.

Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi is quoted as saying: "We question Thaksin's motive for making the statement," Mr Abdullah said. "If [he] has such information, he should convey this to Malaysia through diplomatic channels."

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