Lessons for Australia from Mumbai 26/11 & Paris 13/11: Ignore Army's Tag-E,and it will happen here

by Ganesh Sahathevan

Paris 13/11 and Mumbai 26/11 are  both examples of swarming except that in Paris suicide bombers were utilized to maximize civilian losses within a relatively short incident. It should also be noted that France has a history of jihadi swarms but yet  nothing it appears has been done to counter  the threat. The lesson of Paris is clear: a terrorist threat must be dealt with swiftly.

The late B.Raman wrote extensively on Mumbai 26/11 and provided some suggestions as to how a similar incident could be avoided, based on his experience which included heading the R&AW's counter-terrorism section While each situation is unique, Australian authorities are well advised to take heed of what he proposes.As Lindt and the aftermath of the Cronulla riots proved, Australia's security and intelligence agencies are  incapable of dealing with a Paris or Mumbai style attack.

This is not to say that Australia does not have the means to deal with the threat. The Army's Tactical Assault Group East (Tag-E) was formed just after 9-11 to deal with such threats. In fact, Tag-E trained for an incident such as Lindt in 2013  but the collective incompetence of NSW Police,AFP, ASIO and the PM Tony Abbott's security advisors ensured that Tag-E  capabilities were ignored.

Raman outlined in the article below how India's intelligence and special forces (the National Security Guard, or Black Cats)  could be combined to better address Mumbai type attacks. The same needs to be done here to ensure that Tag-E is the first response to a terrorist attack here. Another "16 hours of peaceful resolution" is not the answer.

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How India can prevent another 26/11

Last updated on: November 24, 2009 19:53 IST

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After his best-selling book, The KaoBoys of R&AW, which glanced at nearly 30 years of his sterling career in India's external intelligence agency, prolific rediff.com columnist B Raman is back with a new potential best-seller: Mumbai 26/11, A Day Of Infamy (Lancer).

Raman, one of India's leading experts on jihadi terrorism, takes a typically incisive look at last November's terror carnage in Mumbai, which he believes was truly an attack by Pakistan on India, and suggests ways we can prevent a recurrence of such attacks. We are honoured to present excerpts from Mumbai 26/11, A Day Of Infamy, kind courtesy of the publishers.

Point 1: Set up a National Commission of professionals with no political agenda, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, to inquire into all the major terrorist strikes that have taken place Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir since November, 2007, and task it to submit its report within four months, with no extensions given.

Its charter will be not the investigation of the criminal cases arising from these terrorist strikes, but the investigation of the deficiencies and sins of commission and omission in our counter-terrorism agencies at the Centre and the states, which made these strikes possible.

Point 2: Make the Intelligence Bureau the nodal point for all liaisons with foreign intelligence and security agencies in respect of terrorism, instead of the Research and Analysis Wing. Give the IB direct access to all foreign internal intelligence and security agencies, instead of having to go through the R&AW.

Point 3: Have a common data base on terrorism shared by the IB and the R&AW directly accessible by authorised officers of the two organisations through a secure password.

Point 4: Make the multi-agency centre of the IB function as it was meant to function when it was created -- as a centre for the continuous identification of gaps and deficiencies in the available intelligence and for removing them and for effective follow-up action.

Point 5: Revive the convert action capability of the R&AW and strengthen it. Its charter should make it clear that it will operate only on foreign territory and not on Indian territory. Give it specific, time-bound tasks. All covert actions should be cleared and co-ordinated by the R&AW. Other agencies should not be allowed to indulge in covert actions.

Point 6: The National Security Guards was created as a special intervention force to deal with terrorist situations such as hijacking and hostage-taking. Stop using it for VIP security purposes.

Point 7: Give the police in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore a special intervention capability to supplement that of the NSG.

Excerpted from Mumbai 26/11: A Day of Infamy, By B Raman, with the kind permission of Lancer Publishers & Distributors.

Image: The cover of B Raman's new book, Mumbai 26/11: A Day of Infamy.