Lu Kewen's proposal for a new regional security role for China likely to raise suspicion of immediate neighbours(Notes)
The Australian PM Lu Kewen has proposed a new regional security role for China during talks in Washington.(http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/01/2204241.htm)
In doing so Lu seems to have forgotten that in our immediate neighbourhood, there remains strong suspicion of China and the Chinese.
Malaysia and Indonesia have a large Chinese population, even if these are in the minority.
The nature of the relationship between the Muslim majority in both countries and their Chinese countrymen is summarised by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew who has said:
'My neighbours both have problems with their Chinese. They are successful, they're hardworking and therefore they are systematically marginalised, even in education.'
Lee also said that the attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia towards Singaporeans shaped by the way they treated their own ethnic Chinese minorities.
(An old Malaysian debate that refuses to die , Straits Times Singapore,27 September 2006)
Both Malaysia and Indonesia regard with suspicion any contact between their Chinese communities and China, even if they are encouraged to trade with China.
These suspicions are based on race, as well as memory of China's support for communist movements in both countries.
Hence, writing in 1991, JN Mak , then of the Malaysian Government's Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) said:
"no matter what twists and turns Malaysia-China relations may take, it can be argued that Malaysia has, and will in the foreseeable future regard China as its greatest threat in one form or another.
(J N. Mak a , The Chinese navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian assessment
Published in: The Pacific Review, Volume 4, Issue 2 1991 , pages 150 - 161 )
There is also concern over China's claims over the Spratly's , even as trade is encouraged:
While many observers still believe that China poises a threat to the Asia–Pacic region, the ASEAN states in general maintain a fairly pragmatic position. Indeed, China as a military concern for the Southeast Asian states stems primary from the Spratlys disputes and China's hostile posture to Taiwan. This critical dispute suggests that Sino–ASEAN relations cannot be taken for granted. (Leong, Ho Khai (2001) 'Rituals, Risks and Rivalries: China and ASEAN in the coming decades', Journal of Contemporary China, 10:29, 683 - 694)
What has evolved out of the circumstances described above is a balance between trade and security, in which the US is relied upon to contain the China threat. This strategy is summarised by Denny Roy:
Southeast Asian states as a group employ two general strategies to protect themselves against domination by a strong China: engagement and hedging. The hedging includes maintaining a modest level of defence cooperation with the United States, which may be called low-intensity balancing against China. This is most clear in the cases of the Philippines and Singapore, and more subtle in the cases of Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thailand appears to practice simple hedging, while Myanmar has no alternative to cooperation with China. The region bandwagons with China only to the extent that it desires trade with China and seeks to avoid the costs of alienating the region's rising great power. These findings suggest the region is far from passive, the United States is still a relevant player, and acceptance of China is premised on Beijing's adherence to the promises made in its recent diplomatic campaign.
(Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?
Roy, Denny ,1 August 2005
Contemporary Southeast Asia)
Given the above, one can see that Lu Kewen's proposal for a new regional security role for China is likely to be met with alarm by our immediate neighbours.Such disquiet cannot be in Australia's interest. The question again arises as why Lu Kewen continues to promote China, even when it may be against Australian interest.
In doing so Lu seems to have forgotten that in our immediate neighbourhood, there remains strong suspicion of China and the Chinese.
Malaysia and Indonesia have a large Chinese population, even if these are in the minority.
The nature of the relationship between the Muslim majority in both countries and their Chinese countrymen is summarised by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew who has said:
'My neighbours both have problems with their Chinese. They are successful, they're hardworking and therefore they are systematically marginalised, even in education.'
Lee also said that the attitude of Malaysia and Indonesia towards Singaporeans shaped by the way they treated their own ethnic Chinese minorities.
(An old Malaysian debate that refuses to die , Straits Times Singapore,27 September 2006)
Both Malaysia and Indonesia regard with suspicion any contact between their Chinese communities and China, even if they are encouraged to trade with China.
These suspicions are based on race, as well as memory of China's support for communist movements in both countries.
Hence, writing in 1991, JN Mak , then of the Malaysian Government's Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) said:
"no matter what twists and turns Malaysia-China relations may take, it can be argued that Malaysia has, and will in the foreseeable future regard China as its greatest threat in one form or another.
(J N. Mak a , The Chinese navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian assessment
Published in: The Pacific Review, Volume 4, Issue 2 1991 , pages 150 - 161 )
There is also concern over China's claims over the Spratly's , even as trade is encouraged:
While many observers still believe that China poises a threat to the Asia–Pacic region, the ASEAN states in general maintain a fairly pragmatic position. Indeed, China as a military concern for the Southeast Asian states stems primary from the Spratlys disputes and China's hostile posture to Taiwan. This critical dispute suggests that Sino–ASEAN relations cannot be taken for granted. (Leong, Ho Khai (2001) 'Rituals, Risks and Rivalries: China and ASEAN in the coming decades', Journal of Contemporary China, 10:29, 683 - 694)
What has evolved out of the circumstances described above is a balance between trade and security, in which the US is relied upon to contain the China threat. This strategy is summarised by Denny Roy:
Southeast Asian states as a group employ two general strategies to protect themselves against domination by a strong China: engagement and hedging. The hedging includes maintaining a modest level of defence cooperation with the United States, which may be called low-intensity balancing against China. This is most clear in the cases of the Philippines and Singapore, and more subtle in the cases of Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thailand appears to practice simple hedging, while Myanmar has no alternative to cooperation with China. The region bandwagons with China only to the extent that it desires trade with China and seeks to avoid the costs of alienating the region's rising great power. These findings suggest the region is far from passive, the United States is still a relevant player, and acceptance of China is premised on Beijing's adherence to the promises made in its recent diplomatic campaign.
(Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?
Roy, Denny ,1 August 2005
Contemporary Southeast Asia)
Given the above, one can see that Lu Kewen's proposal for a new regional security role for China is likely to be met with alarm by our immediate neighbours.Such disquiet cannot be in Australia's interest. The question again arises as why Lu Kewen continues to promote China, even when it may be against Australian interest.
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